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WHAT CAUSES FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
IDEAS? MARITAL PROPERTY IN
ENGLAND AND FRANCE IN THE
THIRTEENTH CENTURY
Charles Donahue, Jr. *t

I.

INTRODUCTION

Categorizing broadly, the marital property systems of the Western nations today are divided into two types: those in which husband and wife own all property separately except those items that
they have expressly agreed to hold jointly (in a nontechnical sense)
and those in which husband and wife own a substantial portion or
even all of their property jointly unless they have expressly agreed to
hold it separately. The system of separate property is the "common
law" system, in force in most jurisdictions where the Anglo-American common law is in force. The system of joint property is the community property system, in force in eight American states and many
of the countries of Western Europe. From jurisdiction to jurisdiction, however, there is considerable variation in the distinction's significance for the spouses' powers to modify the system before
marriage and to control property during the marriage and for what
happens to property when the marriage dissolves. Further, the distinction between the two systems has blurred noticeably over the
past generation. But despite the variation and despite the blurring,
separate property and community property are quite different ways
of thinking about property-holding within the family unit, one of
those fundamental distinctions in legal ideas that affects the way legal results are reached, if not always the result itself. 1
How did this fundamental distinction begin? What combination
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. A.B. 1962, Harvard University;
L.L.B. 1965, Yale University.-Ed.
t Earlier versions of this paper were given at the 1976 Annual Meeting of the American
Society for Legal History, at the Legal History Seminar of the University of Chicago, and at
the Medieval Seminar of the University of California at Berkeley. I received a number of
helpful suggestions and co=ents on all three occasions. In addition I would like to thank
Professors John H. Langbein and Stanley N. Katz and Dr. Robert Palmer for their time and
their criticisms. The many failures of the paper which remain are, of course, my responsibility.
l. See generally M. GLENDON, STATE, LAW AND FAMILY 140-63, 264-72, 279-89 (1977);
COMPARATIVE LAW OF MATRIMONIAL PROPERTY (A. Kiralfy ed. 1972), and sources cited in
both.
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of social, economic, institutional, and ideological factors produced
separate property and what community property? These questions
are important not only for the history of the law of marital property
but also for the broader issue of what forces shape legal ideas. Asking these questions, however, involves some jurisprudential and
methodological assumptions that should be treated in advance.
Legal ideas can be transplanted from societies with one set of
legal institutions and social structures to societies with quite different
institutions and structures.2 The extent to which such transplants
must change in order to grow in their new soil is still imperfectly
known, but once an idea has been formed in one place it clearly can
be borrowed in another for reasons independent of societal and institutional considerations any more specific than those which produce a
propensity for borrowing. Thus, the adoption in the nineteenth century of community property by eight of our western states and the
retention of separate property by the remainder of the American
states may not tell us anything about the societies and institutions of
those states.3 Both ideas were quite well developed at the time they
were adopted in America.
If, however, we can find the origin of the distinction or if we can
find a legal system that rediscovered the distinction independently of
any known outside influences, we may be able to discover the social
and ideological causes of the idea. At least we will have eliminated
transplant as a possible cause of the idea in the system that
originated or rediscovered it. Behind this approach, of course, lies
the assumption that there are social and ideological "causes" oflegal
ideas. Few today would doubt that proposition, however, so long as
"social" and ideological" are defined broadly to include social, economic and political structures and institutions and the general intellectual milieu of those who operate within those structures and
institutions. At this stage of the argument I would like to assume
that the legal ideas do have causes, even if their complexity frequently makes them difficult to identify.
The history of marital property in the West offers us an opportu2. E.g., A. WATSON, LEGAL TRANSPLANTS (1974); compare A. WATSON, SOCIETY AND
LEGAL CHANGE (1977).
3. A good synthetic treatment of marital property in 19th century America is badly needed.
The bare outlines of the story may be found in L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw
184-86, 434-3S (1973). Beyond that, recourse must be had to widely scattered treatments of
specific problems, e.g., Brown, Husband and Wife-Memorandum on the Mississippi Woman's
Law of1839, 42 MICH. L. REV. 1110 (1944); Day, Rights Accruing to a Husband upon Marriage
with Respect to the Property ofHis Wife, 51 MICH. L. REV. 863 (1953); Haskins, The Estate by
the Marital Right, 97 U. PA. L. REV. 345 (1949); McKnight, Texas Community Property LawIts Course of J)eve/opment and Reform, 8 CAL. W. L. REV. 117 (1971).
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nity to examine what might have caused the distinction between separate and community property. The opportunity is afforded by the
fact (which we will have to try to prove) that in the thirteenth century the central royal courts in England came :firmly to adopt a system of separate property while many, if not most, of the customary
jurisdictions in northern France came to adopt various systems of
community property. This coincidence in the development of Western marital property law is fortunate because it allows us to control
for many of the variables that might seem relevant to the development of the distinction:
- Both England and northern France in the thirteenth century
were predominantly agricultural societies.4
- Both countries had a social and politi~al structure that a later
age has called "feudal." 5
-The clerical intellectual elite in both countries shared a common language and culture.6 The lay elite shared a common language and literature.7
•
-At the beginning of the century the legal ideas about marital
property were roughly similar in both countries. 8
Controlling for these variables allows us immediately to eliminate some social and ideological phenomena which have been
thought to be sufficient causes of the rise of community property:
primitive Germanic folk memory, Christianity, the emancipation of
women as either a social or an intellectual phenomenon, and the rise
of the urban middle class.9 Germanic peoples settled in both England and the north of France. Christianity had a pervasive influence
in both countries, and there is no evidence that the English were less
religious than the French. If we look to the history of ideas to discern the "emancipation of women," we will find that writing about
women in the two countries reflects similar characteristically medieval paradoxes~ 10 and on the social level both countries seem to have
4. See generally G. DUBY, RURAL ECONOMY AND COUNTRY LIFE IN THE MEDIEVAL WEST
(1962); M. POSTAN, THE MEDIEVAL ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (fhe Pelican Economic History
of Britain No. l, 1975).
5. See generally F. GANSHOF, FEUDALISM (2d ed. 1961); M. BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY
(1961).
6. See generally D. KNOWLES, THE EVOLUTION OF MEDIEVAL THOUGHT (1962). One of
my personal discoveries of this exercise was the similarity in intellectual method of Bracton
and Beaumanoir.
7. See, e.g., R. BLOCH, MEDIEVAL FRENCH LITERATURE AND LAW (1977).
8. See notes 67-71 in.fro and accompanying text.
9. See, e.g., J. BRJSSAUD, MANUEL D'HISTOIRE DU DROIT1'RIVE 785-90 (1935) and sources
cited therein.
10. Eileen Power's The Position of Women, in THE LEGACY OF THE MIDDLE AGES 401-33
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emerged from the intense masculinity of feudal warrior society at
roughly the same time. Both countries had roughly the same
amount of urbanization. Some or all of these things may be necessary conditions for the rise of community property, but we already
know that they are not sufficient.
The sources of our knowledge of the marital property systems in
both countries are roughly comparable. For England we have the
treatises of Glanvi!l11 and Bracton, 12 for France that of Pierre des
Fontaines (Vermandois) 13 and Beaumanoir (Beauvaisis), 14 the Etablissements de St. Louis (Tourraine-Anjou), 15 the Livres de jostice et
plet (Orleans), 16 and the coutumiers of Artois 17 and Brittany. 18 A
(C. Crump & F. Jacob ed. 1926), remains a classic on this topic. See generally WOMEN IN
MEDIEVAL SOCIETY (S. Stuard ed. 1976) and bibliography in id, at 209-11.
11. THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND COMMONLY CALLED
GLANVILL (G. Hall ed. 1965) [hereinafter cited as GLANVJLL). The author is almost certainly
not Henry II's justiciar, Rannulf Glanvill; but the author knew the practice of the central royal
courts well, and the work can confidently be dated between 1187 and 1189. Id. at xxx-xxxiii.
12. BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND (G. Woodbine ed., s. Thome
trans., 4 vols. to date, 1968-) [hereinafter cited as BRACTON). Formerly thought to be entirely
the work of Henry of Bratton (c. 1210-1267), a royal judge, written in the middle of the 13thcentury, the book is now shown to be of composite authorship with the earliest parts wrillen in
the 1220s and 1230s, perhaps even earlier, and revised, probably by Bracton, in the late 1230s
and emended by him throughout his life. The result is a textual puzzle of formidable complexity. See 3 id. at v-vi, xiii-Iii.
13. LE CONSEIL DE PIERRE DE FoNTAINES (M. Mamier ed. 1846) [hereinafter cited as
CoNSEIL). The author was a royal counsellor and bailiff of Vermandois (northeast of Paris) in
the middle of the 13th century. The work was probably wriuen in the 1250s. Id. al i-x, xx &
n.2.
14. P. DE BEAUMANOIR, COUTUMES DE BEAUVAISIS (A. Salmon ed., 2 vols. 1899) [hereinafter cited as BEAUMANOIR). Unquestionably the work of Phillippe de Remi, sire de Beaumanoir (c. 1250-1296), poet, royal official, and bailiff of the small customary jurisdiction of the
county of Clermont en Beauvaisis near Paris. The first draft of the treatise was completed in
1283, but Beaumanoir made later additions, see I id. at xiii-xviii.
15. 1:ES ETABLISSEMENTS DE SAINT LOUIS (P. Viollet ed. 4 vols. 1881-1886) [hereinafter
cited as ETAB). A composite work, compiled just before 1273. Chapters 1-9 of book I concern
the previJte of Paris and give the work its title; chapters 10-175 of the same book are based on
the coutume ofTouraine-Anjou (the primitive text of which is reproduced in the third volume
of the edition); book 2 is based on the coutume of Orleans. See l id. al 85.
16. LI LIVRES DE JOSTICE ET DE PLET (L. Rapelli ed. 1850) [hereinafter cited as J & PJ. Nol
a coutumier, although the customary rules it cites tend to be those of Orleans, the book is
rather a melange of Roman-canon and customary law, perhaps composed by a student associated with the university of Orleans, probably around 1260. See id. at xiii-xiv, xxvi-xxxiii.
17. COUTUMIER D'ARTOIS (A. Tardif ed. 1883) [hereinafter cited as ARTOIS). A short,
anonymous redaction of customs of this northern customary jurisdiction. It dates from around
1300. See id. at xiv-xv.
18. LA TRES ANCIENNE COUTUME DE BRETAGNE (M. Planiol ed. 1896) [hereinafter cited as
TACB). The authorship is uncertain, but it is almost certainly the work of men who knew the
practice of the ducal court of Brittany well; its redaction dates from the first quarter of the 14th
century. See id. at 5-15. Among the surviving customs of particular cities the most important
for our purposes are those from Amiens: Ancienne coutume municipale d'Amiens: Premiere
coutume [hereinafter cited as 1 Amiens], in 1 RECUEIL DES MONUMENTS JNi!DJTS DE
L'HISTOIRE DU TIERS ETAT 128-50 (J. Thierry ed. 1850). Of anonymous authorship, it dates
from the first half of the 13th century. See id. at 122. Ancienne coutume municipa/e d'Amlens:
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large number of charters from both countries survive, and they give
us valuable, though frequently puzzling, insights into actual practice.19 Records of litigated cases are extraordinarily rich for thirteenth-century England, much less so for France. 20 Thus, while we
know as much or more about what the professionals thought the
rules were in France, we know less of how the rules were applied and
of the mechanics of their development.
There are some difficulties with our comparision which it would
be well to admit before we start. The time periods do not quite coincide. The development of separate property in English law took
place, as we shall see, in the last quarter of the twelfth and the first
half of the thirteenth century, from roughly the time of Glanvill to
that of Bracton. We cannot compare the French law in quite this
period. The French coutumiers with which we will be dealing date
from the second half of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth century. With the advantage of hindsight we can see where
France is going by the end of the thirteenth century, just as we know
where England is going by the time of Bracton. Thus, when we return to the social, economic and political factors that may explain
the difference, we will have to ask why it was that England became
firmly committed to separate property at a time when society was
more feudal and slightly less urban than it was when France ultimately came to adopt community property.
In England we will be looking at the law applied by the royal
courts. This was a relatively unified body of law, generally applicable to freehold tenures ofland throughout the country, and strongly
influenced by upper-class feudal custom. In France, on the other
Seconde coulume [hereinafter cited as 2 Amiens], in id. at 157-76. Again anonymous, it probably dates from the last years of the 13th century. See id. at 151. Missing, because it was
unfortunately unavailable to me, is the 13th-century coutumier of Champagne. L'ANCIEN
COUTUMIER DE CHAMPAGNE (P. Portejoie ed. 1956).
19. A full analysis of the numerous surviving cartularies for England and northern France
of the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries is out of the question in a piece of this scope. In
addition to examining such classics as SIR CHRISTOPHER HATTON's BooK oF SEALS (L. Loyd
& D. Stenton eds. Northamptonshire Rec. Socy. Pub. No. 15, 1950); DocuMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE DANELAW (F. Stenton ed. British Academy, Records of the Social and Economic History of England and Wales No. 5, 1920), and
CARTULAIRE LE L'ABBAYE DE LA SAINTE TRINITE DE TIRON[-GARDAIS] (L. Merlet ed. 2 vols.
1883) to get a feel for earlier charter style, I have attempted some "soundings" of a statistical
nature. See note 117 i,!fra.
20. Fifteen volumes of GREAT BRITAIN, CURIA REGIS, CURIA REGIS ROLLS (1922-1972)
are in print, dating from the 1190s to 1237. For other printed records of the central royal
courts, see C. GROSS, A BIBLIOGRAPHY OF ENGLISH HISTORY TO 1485 at 524-33 (E. Graves ed.
1975). By contrast the records of the judgments of the par/emenl of Paris (LES OLIM ou REGISTRES DES ARRETS (L. Beugnot ed. 3 vols. in 4 1839-1848)) are late and not particularly helpful
for our purposes.
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hand, there was no unified body of royal law. We can keep our comparison between laws of similar scope if we exclude anything for
France specifically labeled as burgage or roturier (commoners') custom, and also if we focus on what seem to be the common denominators of the French customs. Thus we will not spend much time
with the local variations in the west of France where division by
thirds rather than halves was the custom21 or with those in the far
north of modem France (and parts of modem Belgium) which
tended toward a system of total community,22 just as we will ignore
manorial or burgage custom in England and the gavelkind custom of
Kent. 23 We will also discount those areas where foreign influence
was obviously at work: the southern third of France, the pays de
droit ecrit, where Roman law influence was strong,24 and Normandy
where English influence was strong.25
Thus, while there are undeniable difficulties, the comparison will
be drawn basically between likes: the laws of two feudal societies in
two rural areas at roughly the same time. The social patterns, degrees of urbanization, and economies of the two countries were
roughly similar. There are obvious differences between the world
described by M.M. Postan26 and that described by Marc Bloch,27 but
they are recognizably the same world.
II.

THE LAW

The aphorism, "At English common law the husband and wife
were one and that one was the husband," may be amusing, but it is
misleading. The fundamental characteristic of the thirteenth century
common law of marital property by the time of Bracton was not the
unity of husband and wife but their separation. 28 The husband had
21. See Yver, Les caracteres originaux du groupe des coutumes de l'Ouest de la France, 30
REVUE HISTORIQUE DE DROIT FRAN«;:AIS ET ETRANGER 18, 39-40 (1952); see generally id.
22. See 3 P. OURLIAC & J. DE MALAFOSSE, HISTOIRE DU DROIT PRIVE 9-10, 253-54 (1968)
[hereinafter cited as OuRLIAC & MALAFOSSE]; Lemaire, Les origines de la communaute de biens
entre epoux dons le droit coutumier franrais, 1 REVUE HISTORIQUE DE DROIT FRAN«;:AIS ET
ETRANGER 584, 629 & n.4 (1928).
23. See 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF
EDWARD I 268-73, 279-83, 418-19 (2d ed. reissue 1968) [hereinafter cited as P & M]; Howell,
Peasant Inheritance Customs in the Midlands, 1280-1700, in FAMILY AND INHERITANCE 112-55
(J. Goody, J. Thirsk &E. Thompson eds. 1976).
24. See I E. CHENON, HISTOIRE GENERALE DU DROIT FRAN«;:AIS PUBLIC BT PRIVE DBS
ORIGINES A 1815 at f 192 (1926).
25. See R. BESNIER, LA COUTUME DE NoRMANDIE-HISTOIRE EXTERNB 56-69 (1935).
26. M. POSTAN, su_pra note 4.
27. M. 13LOCH, FRENCH RURAL HISTORY (1973).
28. The bask outlines of this scheme appear already in Glanvil!s remarkable treatise on
dos (including dower, maritagium and inheritance law generally). GL.ANPILL, supra note 11,
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his lands, the wife hers. The husband's heirs succeeded to his lands,
the wife's heirs to hers, and as a general rule neither husband nor
wife had the power of testamentary disposition over land. True, the
husband's lands were subject to the wife's dower-her right to a life
estate, normally in one-third of those lands, if he predeceased
her29 - and the wife's lands were subject to the husband's right to
take the rents and profits during the marriage and to his right to a
life estate in the whole if she predeceased him and if a child were
born of the marriage. Each party had to join in a conveyance if the
land was to be sold free of that party's interest, but the husband
could sell his interest both in his land and in that of his wife without
her consent. These were the rules for land; in the case of personal
property we can be considerably less certain.30 It would seem that
during the marriage the husband had the power to manage and to
alienate both his chattels and those of his wife, a fact which led later
courts to suggest that he "owned" his wife's chattels. If he predeceased his wife, she was apparently entitled to whatever was left of
her chattels and to one-third of his. If she predeceased him, he may
have been entitled only to a third of what was left of her chattels.
So strong was the notion of separate property within the marital
unit that conveyances to husband and wife tended to be treated as
separate property of one or the other of them. The commonest form
of such conveyance was the liberum maritagium, which the early
charters describe as a grant of property by the woman's family (normally her father or brother) to the husband with the woman. In
Glanvill's time the effect of such a grant was, in modem terms, to
give any husband of the woman a life estate in the property with a
remainder to the heirs of her body, usually for three generations, and
with a reversion to the granter and his heirs in default of heirs of her
body. 31 By Bracton's time a development, still imperfectly underchs. 6-7. To this we must add BRACTON, supra note 12, fols. 17-24 (on gifts subject to modus
including maritagia); fols. 60-6lb (on causa mortis gifts and wills); fols. 92-98 (on dower); fols.
296-317 (actions concerning dower); fols. 32lb-323 (writs of entry cui in vita and writs concerning dower); fols. 438-39 (on curtesy). See 2 P & M, supra note 23, at 399-436, whose statement
01the rules remains fundamental, at least for Bracton's time.
29. In Glanvill's time one-third was the "reasonable" dower, at least for military tenures.
At the time of the marriage the husband could "name" less but not more than one-third.
GLANVILL, supra note 11, 6.1. Widows ofsocage tenants may have been entitled to one-half,
but one-third remained the norm. 2 P & M, supra note 23, at 420-22. See notes 79-83 infra
and accompanying text.
30. See 2 P & M, supra note 23, at 427-33.
31. GLANVILL, supra note 11, 7.18. If the wife survived the husband, she probably got a
life estate, unless there was an heir, in which case he may have taken immediately. See Milsom, Inheritance by Women in the Twelfth and Early Thirteenth Centuries, in ON THE LAWS
AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND: EsSAYS IN HONOR OF SAMUEL E. THORNE (M. Arnold, T.
Green, S. Scully & S. White eds., forthcoming). By Bracton's time the widow probably got a
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stood, was leading to holdings that maritagia could be alienated in
fee simple (by husband alone? by husband and wife together? by
widows and widowers alone?) as soon as issue had been born to the
marriage. This result was reversed by the famous statute De Donis
in 1285, and as a consequence the unbarrable entail made its appearance in English law.32
The maritagium is the only form of joint holding by husband and
wife discussed at any length by the treatise writers, and as we have
seen it came to be treated like the wife's separate inheritance with a
peculiar descent pattern rather than like any form of community
property. There are also examples in the feet of fines of husbands
and wives taking property in both their names and not as
maritagium.33 How the descent pattern in such conveyances worked
we do not know. It seems likely that the land passed to t~e survivor
of the husband and wife and thence to their heirs, at least when their
heirs were the same. We cannot even speculate as to what happened
when their heirs differed (i e. , in default of issue). 34 Almost certainly
the making of the fine would bar any reversion in the grantor. A
later age would call this form of co-tenancy a tenancy by the entireties, and the heirs of the surviving spouse would take to the exclusion
of the heirs of the first dying spouse. 35
If the fundamental characteristic of marital property in England
was separation despite the marriage and the fundamental division is
between land and chattels, in France the concept of separate property co-existed with that of a community of property because of the
marriage, and the fundamental divisions were among family land
(propres or heritages), acquired land (acquets or conquets), and
moveables (meubles). 36 The husband's family land is his separate
property, or perhaps it might be better to say the separate property of
his family, because the husband's power to alienate was tightly conlife estate even if there were an heir, at least if she had been named as a grantee, See
BRACTON, supra note 12, fols. 77b at 224, 262b; compare id. fols. 21-24, 28b-29, 92b at 267,
130b at 368.
32. For these developments, see T. PLUCKNEIT, LEGISLATION OF EDWARD I, at 128-35
(1949).
33. E.g., 2 P & M, supra note 23, at 434 and sources cited therein; PEDES FJNIUM, COMMONLY CALLED FEET OF FINES FOR THE COUNTY OF SOMERSET, RICHARD I TO EDWARD I,
no. 78, at 6-7; no. 49, at 14-15; no. 35, at 18 (E. Green ed., Somerset Rec. Socy. no. 6, 1892),
34. BRACTON, supra note 12, fol. 28b, at 96, discussing a gift (not a fine) made to husband
and wife and their heirs and not in maritagium, says that if common heirs of the two fail, "their
separate heirs (so it seems) are admitted." Compare id. fol. 262b.
35. See 2 P & M, supra note 23, at 434.
36. See R. GRAFE, DAS EHERECHT IN DEN COUTUMIERS DES 13. JAHRHUNDERTS 93-162
(Gclttinger Studien zur Rechtsgeschichte No. 6, 1972) [hereinafter cited as GRAFE] and sources
cited therein; see generally 3 OURLIAC & MALAFOSSE, supra note 22, at 240-60, 479-98,
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trolled in the interest of his heirs. 37 The husband's family land was
also subject to a dower interest in his wife, generally a life estate of
one-half, which further impeded his power to alienate it.38 The
wife's family land was subject to the same limitations with respect to
her heirs, but the husband had no dower interest in it. 39 The acquests, on the other hand, were - I use the term with some hesitation - community property of husband and wife. The usual pattern
called for their equal division upon the death of one spouse between
that spouse's heirs and the surviving spouse.40 Each spouse's half
was subject to his or her testamentary disposition,41 and in some
areas the husband's sale or gift of acquests required the wife's consent.42 The rules about moveables were as uncertain as those in England about personal property. Suffice it to say that the husband had
extensive powers of management and control over them, but the
wife's right of succession to all or part of them was leading some
writers to conceive of them as being community property as well. 43
To attribute community property to thirteenth-century France
runs counter to the trend of modem scholarship which would place
it, at the earliest, in the fourteenth century when the word "community" was first used in the context of marital property.44 No doubt
37. See text at notes 94-95 iefra. See generally 3 OuRLIAC & MALAFOSSE, supra note 22, at
479-98; GRAFE, supra note 36, at 104-18.
38. 3 OURLIAC & MALAF0SSE, supra note 22, at 248-52 and sources cited therein; GRAFE,
supra note 36, at 118-38.
39. See notes 36 & 38 supra. For the custom of veuftte in Normandy and in some of the
western French customs, see 3 OURLIAC & MALAFOSSE, supra note 22, at 252 and sources cited
therein.
40. The key text is J & P, supra note 16, 12.24.5, at 256: "Et se home conquiert, lui et sa
feme, et meure, sa feme sera heir en la moitil:, par la reson de la compoignie; et des meubles
ausint." See TACB, supra note 18, § 217; 1 Amiens, supra note 18, § 63; BEAUMANOIR, supra
note 14, §§ 503,621, 930-31, 1407-09, 1639. The Burgundy customs of the 13th century are to
the same effect. Cited in Lemaire, supra note 22, at 637-38.
41. See BEAUMAN0IR, supra note 14, § 365; J & P, supra note 16, 12.3.1; compare
BEAUMAN0IR, supra note 14, § 1973.
42. J & P, supra note 16, 8.3.1 - .2; see TACB, supra note 16, § 40.
43. See ETAB., supra note 15, 1.143; J & P, supra note 16, 12.24.5; 1 Amiens, supra note 18,
§ 63; cf. TACB, supra note 18, § 42; 2 Amiens, supra note 18, § 47 (both dividing moveables
mto thirds).
44. Couslumes lenues loules noloires et iugees au chaste/et de Paris§ 14, in 2 J. BR0DEAU,
CoMMENTAIRE SUR LA C0USTUME DE LA PREV0STE ET VICOMTE DE PARIS App. I at 5 (1658);
JJecisions de messire Iean des Mares (hereinafter cited as Pseudo-des-Mares] § 247, in id. App.
II at 37 (for both of these late 14th-century works, see 1 F. OLIVIER-MARTIN, HISTOIRE DE LA
C0UTUME DE LA PREV0TE ET VIC0MTE DE PARIS 88-89 (1922)); but cf. ETAB., supra note 15,
1.143 ("Et einsinc puet l'en entendre que li meuble sunt communal."). For the trend, see
Roussier, La donation des biens communs par le mari en droil coulumier parisien (pt. 1), 31
REVUE H!ST0RIQUE DE DROIT FRAN<;AIS ET ETRANGER 498 (1953); Petot, Les meubles des
epoux au moyen age d'apres /es coulumesji-anr;aises, 3 REVUE INTERNATIONALE DES DR0ITS DE
L'ANTIQUITE (2 MELANGES FERNAND DE VISSCHER) 213 (1949); OURLIAC & MALAFOSSE,
supra note 22, at 252-60; GRAFE, supra note 36, at 96-100.
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the thirteenth-century system lacked many of the refinements of the
later system, and moveables and acquests had not yet been firmly
brought together conceptually.45 Further, the distinction between
separate and community property was blurred by the fact that all
thirteenth-century European legal systems suppressed the wife's legal power to possess, enjoy and convey any property during coverture, and many gave her a well-nigh unbarrable share of her
husband's separate property if she survived him. Thus all of the
thirteenth-century systems of marital property tended to look something like, in modem terms, ownership in the husband with an expectancy or future interest in the wife.
On the other hand, in a world in which commercial sale of land
was relatively rare, its testamentary disposition was severely limited,
and credit transactions were fairly primitive, the most important
practical indication of community property was to be found in succession patterns. In many places in France moveables and acquests
were divided equally between husband and wife without regard to
who died first. The facts that many thirteenth-century authors noted
the similarity of succession customs regarding acquests and moveables46 and that at least one attributed the succession pattern for
moveables and acquests to the partnership (compagnie) between husband and wife47 indicate that these authors were struggling, however
imperfectly, with a concept for which we have no better term than
"community property."
We must take care not to exaggerate the differences between the
English and French systems. In both systems family land passed to
children and in the absence of children to the heirs on the side from
whence it came, although primogeniture was not nearly so strong in
France as in England.48 In both systems the widow was entitled to
be endowed of her husband's family lands, and hence such lands
were not fully alienable without her consent. In both, the husband
had some power over the wife's land, but this power did not extend
to full alienation. In both, the husband's power over moveables during coverture was great, but the wife stood to inherit a part of them,
at least if her husband predeceased her. Further and perhaps most
4S. See especially Roussier, supra note 44, at S03-04; Pelot, supra note 44, at 214.
46. 1 Amiens, supra note 18, § 63; 1 ETAB., supra note IS, 1.143; J & P, supra note 16,
12.24.5; Burgundy customs, cited in Lemaire, supra note 22, at 637-38; compare BEAUMANOIR,
supra note 14, § 1639; Pseudo-des-Mares, supra note 44, § 247.
47. J & P, supra note 16, 12.24.5; compare BEAUMANOJR, supra note 14, § 622, which
speaks of the compagnie between husband and wife but does not tie it to the succession provisions for moveables and acquests.
48. See 3 OURLIAC & MALAFOSSE, supra note 22, at 401-04.
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important, it was possible in each country to achieve by private arrangement results similar to those in the other country so long as the
requisite consents were obtained. The scarcity of secular charters in
both countries during this period makes it difficult, perhaps impossible, to discover how far one could replicate the French system in
England and vice versa and how commonly this was done. But
enough has survived to show that people changed the rules by private agreement in both countries.49
But there were differences. The power to alienate family land
was much greater in England than in France. In France acquests
were normally divided in halves upon the death of one of the parties,
and the woman's right to her share did not depend on her surviving
her husband. In the case of a childless marriage, her heirs, not his,
inherited her half. In addition, in France both ·parties seem to have
had the power of testamentary disposition over their portion of the
acquests.50 While the rules about moveables are considerably less
clear, in England the basic notion seems to have been one of separate
treatment and division into thirds, while in France the basic notion
seems to have been, or at least to have been heading toward, community treatment and division into halves. 51
Thus, there was a difference and the difference, as we noted
above, is reflected in the language of the contemporary writers. The
question is why the difference?

III. How THE

DIFFERENCE CAME ABOUT

The English common law system of the thirteenth century was
already quite professionalized; the customary French jurisdictions
were less professionalized, but the coutumiers themselves show that
professionalization was increasing by the second half of the century.
49. In both countries the surviving charters deal principally with gifts or sales to the
church. See sources cited in note 19 supra. While some of these charters raise issues relevant
to our purposes, they rarely show us grantors attempting to change the descent pattem of land
within the family. (But cf. 2 CHARTES ET DOCUMENTS DE L'ABBAYE DE SAINT-MAGLOIRE (A.
Terroine & L. Fossier eds. Institut de recherche et d'histoire des textes, Documents, etudes et
repetoires No. 12, 1966), for a remarkable series of documents in which husbands and wives
convey to the abbey, specifically revoking their rights and those of their families.) We know,
however, that English grantors frequently attempted to favor younger sons and daughters, see
generally MILSOM, supra note 31, and that French grantors/testators frequently attempted to
shift the inheritance pattems within their families. See generally J. YvER, EGALITE ENTRE
HERITIERS ET EXCLUSION DES ENFANTS DOTES (1966).
50. See H. AUFFROY, EVOLUTION DU TESTAMENT EN FRANCE 619-29 (1889); BEAUMANOIR, supra note 14, § 365; J & P, supra note 16, 12.3.l; compare BEAUMANOIR, supra note 14,
§ 1973.
5 l. See Pelot, supra note 44; for division into thirds in the west of France, see Yver, supra
note 21, at 38-39.
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Before we s_eek any economic, political, or social explanations of the
differences between the two countries' marital property systems, we
should look to see if the differences in the legal ideas available in
each system sufficiently explain the differences in marital property.
It may be that the thirteenth-century rules for marital property in the
two countries were simply the product of logical deduction from preexisting legal rules that differed between the two countries. This discovery would not preclude the possibility that thirteenth-century economic, political, or social forces also helped to produce the rules,
but it would deprive us of any need for such explanations. It would
also suggest that a more fruitful time to look for such explanations
would be the time when the logical antecedents of the thirteenthcentury rules arose.
Some scholars of a previous generation saw community property
as the inevitable result of provisions in the codes of the Germanic
invaders ofEurope.52 Frequently cited in support of this proposition
were provisions in the seventh-century code of the Ripuarian
Franks, in the Visigothic Code of the same century, and in a portion
ascribed to the Westphalians of the early ninth-century Old Saxon
Code. 53 It is hard to accept this explanation today. If the argument
to be derived from these provisions is that all the Germanic peoples
had community property and that they preserved the institution as a
kind of folk practice whence it was codified in the customary law of
the High Middle Ages, then we cannot explain why England, which
was if anything more Germanic than the north of France, did not
adopt community property, while most of the north of France did. If
the argument is that some of the Germanic peoples had community
property, while some did not, we would expect to find customs of
community dominant only in those areas settled by tribes that are
thought to have had it. The actual pattern of community property
52. This view is particularly noticeable in older German writers, e.g., R. HUEBNER, A HisTORY OF GERMANIC PRIVATE LAW 621-46 (Continental Legal History Series No. 4, 1918);
even R. SCHRODER, GESCHICHTE DES EHELICHEN GOITERRECHTS (2 vols. in 4, 1863-1874)
[hereinafter cited as SCHRODER], though he is considerably more cautious and detailed, tends
to overemphasize continuity at the expense of change. W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, PRtNCI·
PLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY§§ 8, 13-18 (2d ed. 1971), is a particularly egregious modem
example.
53. Lex Ribuaria 37.2, in 5 MONUMENTA GERMANIAE HISTORICA: LEGUM 232 (18751889): "Si autem per seriem scripturarum ei nihil contulerit, si virum supervixerit, 50 so/idos in
dotem recipiat, et tertiam par/em de omni re quam simul con/aboraverant, sibi studeat evindicare,
vel quicquid ei in morgangeba traditumfuerat, similiterfacial." Lex Visigothorum 4.2.16 (division of acquests according to the wealth of the spouses), in 1.1 MONUMENTA GERMANIAE
H!STORICA: LEGES NATIONUM GERMAMICARUM 183 (1902). Lex Saxonum c. 48 (giving the
woman one-half of the acquests), in 5 MONUMENTA, supra at 74. For the dates, see 1 H.
CONRAD, DEUTSCHE RECHTSGESCHICHTE 59, 132, 133-34 (2d ed. 1962).
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customs is much too complex for such a simple explanation: The
southern portion of the area settled by the Visigoths (the north of
modem Spain) seems to have had community property in the High
Middle Ages, but much of the northern portion (southern France)
did not;54 systems of community exist generally in the area settled by
the Franks, both in those settled by the Ripuarian Franks and in
those settled by the Salian Franks, whose primitive code shows no
evidence of community; 55 community is found in a number of areas
where the Saxons settled, but is not so dominant in Westphalia as the
primitive Saxon code would lead us to expect.56
Perhaps more important, none of the provisions in the Germanic
codes has the kind of precision which would allow us to say that it
represented anything more than a tendency in the direction of community property. 57 Provisions similar to, if not quite the same as,
those in the Ripuarian and Visigothic Codes may be found in a
number of Germanic codes from areas, including England, where
community property ultimately was not accepted. 58 And none of the
Germanic peoples kept nearly enough ethnic cohesion to suggest
that a custom peculiar to one tribe remained intact in the turbulent
years between the redaction of the early Germanic codes and the
thirteenth century.
So far as the north of France is concerned, the generally accepted
view today59 would trace the origins of community property to the
break-up of the ethnic cohesion of the Germanic peoples in the
eighth and ninth centuries and the consequent uncertainty about the
rules governing the widow's rights in her husband's property. (These
rights had been fixed at a half or a third in at least some of the Germanic codes.) 60 What had been a legal right became a contract right.
At the time of marriage men would agree to endow their wives with
54. For the system in Spain, see W. DE FUNIAK & M. VAUGHN, supra note 52, §§ 23-36;
for that in the south of France, see OuRLIAC & MALAF0SSE, supra note 22, at 279-86.
55. See generally 2.2 SCHRODER, supra note 52.
56. No fewer than five main systems of community property existed in Saxony in the High
Middle Ages, ranging from total separation to total community. The system of total separation
did not exist in Westphalia, but the other four did, including two which gave the surviving
spouse only an expectancy in some or all of the first-dying spouse's property. Clearly more
than the survival of the primitive provision is needed to account for these variations. See 2.3
SCHRODER, supra note 52, at 1-80.
57. For a recent reinterpretation of the Visigothic provisions, see M. MER~A, EsTuDos DE
DIREIT0 VISIG0TIC0 23-48 (1948).
58. Cf. l SCHRODER, supra note 52, at 84-89 (Lombard law); id. at 94-98 (Anglo-Saxon
law); compare id. at 103-06 (Burgundian and Alamannian law).
59. Lemaire, supra note 22, is the.leading article. For its general acceptance, see Petot,
supra note 44, at 213.
60. Lemaire, supra note 22, at 586-88; see notes 52-53 supra.
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a third or a half of their family lands or, significantly, their family
lands and their acquests.61 Independent of this conventional dower
in acquests, husbands and wives in the tenth and eleventh centuries
came more and more to take acquests during the marriage in both
their names.62
This system, totally dependent upon private agreement, lasted in
France until the beginning of the thirteenth century. At that point, it
became the rule that dower could exist only in family land, but it
would exist even absent agreement.63 At the same time, family land
was sharply distinguished from acquests. The heirs' rights in family
land solidified in a way that greatly impeded its alienation. By contrast, the woman's rights in acquests, which were not subject to the
heirs' control, were expanded from a conventional to a legal right to
one-half, from a life estate dependent upon survival to an estate in
inheritance without regard to survival. 64 In short, dower in acquests
and the practice of taking acquests jointly merged into a legal rule
that acquests belonged one-half to the wife. It was only in the latter
part of the thirteenth century or perhaps not until the fourteenth that
moveables and debts were fully incorporated into this system. 65
Now this describes how this development occurred; it does not
explain why it occurred. The combination of the ideas of conventional dower in acquests and the practice of joint acquisition of land
is understandable, but nothing in the logic of either idea requires
that the combination be made or that a matter of agreement become
a matter of rule. The history, however, of the way the French arrived at the notion of community property suggests where we ought
to look in order to determine why the English did not arrive at the
same notion. We are unlikely, for example, to get much help from
61. Lemaire, supra note 22, at 588-609.
62. Id. at 610-21.
63. Id. at 609. BEAUMANOIR, supra note 14, § 445, attributes this result to an ordonnance
of Philip Augustus of 1214. Compare CoNSElL, supra note 13, 21.45, for evidence contemporary with Beaumanoir of the ordonnance. Both the existence of the ordonnance and its import
are controversial. See GRAFE, supra note 36, at 120 & n.550. The evidence suggests, at the
very least, that there was legislative activity in this regard at the beginning of the thirteenth
century. See note 102 infra.
64. Lemaire, supra note 22, at 626-43. Not all of the 13th-century customs had arrived at
this point. For Pierre des Fontaines it is still a matter of agreement: "II n'est mie usee chose
par nostre usage, que on puist riens covenantier A sa feme A !'espouser, de son heritage, qu'ele
le tiengne come propre heritage apres le mariage; mes de son conquest le puet-on fere." CON·
SEIL, supra note 13, 15.12. The coutume of Artois recognizes only an unbarrable dower in
acquests, even though it recognizes community in moveables and debts. ARTOIS, supra note
17, 32.3, 34.3. Both customs, moreover, distinguish between propres and acqults for purposes
of allowing freer alienation of the latter than the former. Id. at 36.3; CoNSEIL, supra note 13,
33.15.
65. Petot, supra note 44, at 213; GRAFE, supra note 36, at 147-65.
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the fact that in England (probably to a greater extent than in France)
jurisdiction over succession to land and succession to chattels was in
separate courts (the king's courts for the former, the church's for the
latter). The separation of jurisdictions cannot explain what happened in England because community prop·erty, or at least that part
of it which is most different from English practice, began not with
moveables but with acquests of land. Nor can the upper-class character of the English common law fully explain its aversion to community property. The charters in which the French developments
can be traced come chiefly from the marriage settlements of the feudal nobility.66
If we look to the legal elements which led to community property
in France, we find that they all existed in England at the beginning
of the thirteenth century:
- In England as in France there was a tradition dating back to
66. Here we must depart from Maitland, who, as far as I know, is the only authority who
seriously considers why France adopted community property and England rejected it. 2 P &
M, supra note 23, at 402-03. Maitland, like us, notes that at times English lawyers do not seem
far from the idea of community. See id. at 400-01, 407, 427-33. Like us, he rejects any "ethnical" explanation (id. at 402) and any based on the emancipation of women (id. at 403). He
settles on two explanations: (1) "about the-year 1200 our property law was cut in twain. The
whole province of succession to moveables was made over to the tribunals of the church"; and
(2) the upper-class character of English law ("in England the law for the great becomes the law
for all"). Id. at 402. Both explanations seem to me to rest on assumptions (which admittedly
Maitland did not spell out) that are wrong. (In fairness to Maitland, I should hasten to add
that these assumptions were based on the best Continental scholarship of his day.) In the case
of the ecclesiastical jurisdiction explanation the assumptions seem to be two: (1) that the
division of succession jurisdiction between ecclesiastical and secular courts on the basis of
whether the property at issue was moveable or immoveable was peculiar to England. (It
wasn't, although the line may have been sharper in England than it was in France. See, e.g.,
A. LEFEBVRE-TE!LLARD, LES OFF!CIALITES A LA VEILLE DU CONCILE DE TRENTE 116-19
(1973); P. FOURNIER, LES OFFICIALITES AU MOYEN-AGE 87-88 (1880)). (2) That chattel were
critical to the rise of community property in France. (They were not, as we have seen; they
were a later addition.) Once we know that community property began with a specialized treatment of acquests. of land, the separation of jurisdictions so far as testaments of chattel are
concerned does not help us very much. Rebuttal of the second argument "The law for the
great becomes the law for all" is harder, because Maitland's aphorisms always have some truth
in them. If what he meant was that feudal considerations may have played a role in the development of separate property, I think he was right. See text at notes 76-86, 97-103 infra. If
what he meant was that the existence of a common royal feudal law played a role, again, I
think he was right. See text at notes 86, 101-05 infra. In both cases, however, it remains to
explain how and why those two phenomena produced that result. I think, however, Maitland
was trying to suggest something a bit different and something which I do not think is right.
Maitland saw community property as essentially an urban middle-class phenomenon to which
the feudal aristocracy in Europe came late, if at all. Now, however correct Maitland may have
been that the process of development of the common law was one in which rules designed for a
feudal aristocracy became the rules for all, this process can not explain the absence of community property in England, unless it can be shown that community property was not a system
used by the feudal aristocracy elsewhere. While the evidence is by no means all in, the prevailing view today would suggest that we can see the origins of community property in the charters
01the feudal aristocracy as early as the 11th century. So the question remains: why was it not
accepted by the feudal aristocracy in England?
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the time of the Germanic codes that the widow be entitled to a share
of the marital property upon her husband's death. 67 Indeed, the provision in the Ripuarian Code that some have seen as the basis of
community property is quoted with some alterations in the Laws of
Henry I. 68
-In England as in France it was customary, although not required, that the husband endow his wife with a share not only of his
family land but also of acquests.69
-In England as in France married couples frequently acquired
title to property in both their names.70
- Perhaps most important, the distinction between family land
and acquests, a distinction critical to the rise of community property
in France, also existed in England. For example, G/anvill reports
that without his heirs' consent a landowner can give away all of his
acquests but only a reasonable part of his family land.71
The question then is why did these elements not combine in England to produce the same result as in France? For by the end of the
thirteenth century the distinction between family land and acquests
had all but disappeared, at least in the king's courts,72 and although
the practice of acquiring land in the name of both husband and wife
remained, 73 it never became a rule of law as it did in France.
Our examination of the way in which community property developed in Northern France suggested that the critical distinction was
between family land and acquests. As a result of recent work by
S.F.C. Milsom74 we are now in a position to explain how it was that
the English common law came to obliterate that distinction. Building on earlier work by S.J. Bailey and S.E. Thome,75 Milsom has
61. See l SCHRODER, supra note 52, at 94-98, and sources cited therein.
68. LEGES HENRICI PRIM! 70.22, at 224 (L. Downer ed. 1972); see 2 P & M, supra note 23,
at 402.
69. See GLANPILL, supra note 11, 6.2.
10. See sources cited in note 33 supra.
71. GLANPILL, supra note 11, 7.1, at 70-71. See Holt, Politics and Proper/)' in Early Medieval England, 51 PAST & PRESENT 3 (1972), which clearly establishes that the distinction existed
in England before Glanvill's time, however controversial its other conclusions may be.
72. See T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 526-30 (5th ed. 1956);
S. MILSOM, THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF ENGLISH FEUDALISM 121-27 (1976).
73. E.g., PEDES FINIUM, supra note 33, no. 49, at 250-51; no. 54, at 252. Even here, however, the tendency is to put the inheritance in one line or the other. E.g., id. no. 26, at 243 (to
husband and wife and the heirs of the husband); no. 44, at 249 (to husband and wife for life,
remainder in tail to their son, remainder in tail to their other son, remainder in tail to the heirs
of the wife, reversion to the grantor).
74. S. MILSOM, supra note 72.
75. Bailey, Warranties of Land in the Thirteenth Century (pts. 1 & 2), 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
274 (1944); 9 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 82 (1945); Bailey, Warranties ofLand in the Reign ofRicl1ard I,

November 1979]

Marital Property

75

shown how hereditability of land came to be firmly established in
the late twelfth century because the royal courts forced lords and
their heirs to honor the warranty to a man and his heirs implicit in
the taking of homage. The rules designed to ensure hereditability
also operated, probably unintentionally in Milsom's view, to make
land freely alienable inter vivos but not alienable at all by testament.
Another result, probably also unintended, was the obliteration of the
distinction between family lands and acquests.
A few simple examples may serve to illustrate. 76 Suppose William holds land of Ralph as his father and grandfather have before
him. Ralph dies and his son, fitz Ralph, succeeds, 9r William dies
and his son, fitz William, succeeds. The form of action will depend
on what has happened, but the result will be the same: the homage
Ralph took from William will bind fitz Ralph and will inure to the
benefit of both William and fitz William.
Now let us suppose that William alienates the land to Thomas
and then dies. Normally he will have taken Thomas' homage, ie., •
the alienation will be by way of subinfeudation rather than substitution. 77 When fitz William seeks to recover the land, on the ground,
let us say, that the land was family land rather than acquest, he will
be met with the same argument that fitz Ralph was met with in the
preceding case: you are bound by the homage which your ancestor
took from me.78
If, on the other hand, William attempts to alienate the land to
Thomas by testament, there is no homage by which fitz William can
be bound, nor is there any reason why Ralph should let Thomas in.
If he does let Thomas in, he is in trouble: he must both honor his
warranty to fitz William and find Thomas an exchange tenement.
The key figure in the whole scheme is the heir. He is bound by
his ancestor's warranties, and he benefits from the warranties made
to his ancestor. The remarkable thing is not that community property did not develop out of this system, but that any scheme of marital property did. It did so because elements of the warranty system
were taken to inure to the benefit of the surviving spouse.
Again, a few simple examples may serve to illustrate. Suppose
9 CAMBRIDGE L.J.
BRIDGE L.J. 193.

192 (1946); Thome, English Feudalism and Estates in Land, [1959]

CAM-

76. All of the following examples are loosely based on MILSOM, supra note 72.
77. I.e., Thomas will hold the land of William who in tum will still hold it of his lord
(subinfeudation), rather than Thomas holding it of William's lord directly (substitution).
78. See S. MILSOM, supra note 72, at 125-26, where such a claim is made, but the case
proves the point: the grant had been in maritagium and in all probability no homage was
taken.
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William has married an heiress, Bertha. She cannot do homage for
her land to her lord, Payn, but William can and does. If Bertha predeceases William, Payn's homage to William is still good. William is
tenant "by the law of England," and the only unusual things about
his situation are that he may be put out of the land if a living child
has not been born to his marriage with Bertha and that her heirs, if
they are different from his, will ultimately inherit the land. If William predeceases Bertha, there will be a squabble. Ultimately it will
be established that she will be able to recover the land from fitz William and from William's alienee, but neither of these results is dictated by the logic of warranty.79
If William has brought land into the marriage, he may have endowed Bertha with a specific part of it. He has not taken Bertha's
homage for it, but perhaps the marriage substitutes for homage. If
William predeceases her, she may recover the land from fitz William
who is said to be bound to warrant her dower. If William has alienated the land to Thomas, fitz William must warrant both Thomas
and Bertha, finding an exchange tenement fo! the former and giving
the land to the latter. If there is not enough land for both Bertha and
Thomas, Bertha has priority. so
During the course of the thirteenth century Bertha's rights expanded in two directions. First, she came to have a claim against fitz
William for "reasonable" dower, normally a one-third life estate in
the land of which her husband was seised at the time of the marriage, unless he had expressly endowed her of less, even if fitz William did not have enough land to satisfy her claim. Thus, she had
priority over William's alienees even for unspecified dower. 81 Second, from her entitlement to dower in those lands which her husband acquired during the marriage, if he had expressly endowed her
of acquests at the time of the marriage, 82 she came to be entitled to
be endowed of all lands of which her husband was seised at any time
79. See generally Milsom, Inheritance by Women, supra note 3 I. The mechanism by which
she recovers from William's alienee is !he writ of entry cui in vita. See BRACTON, supra note
12, fols. 321b-323. The mechanism by which she got the land in preference to fitz William is
imperfectly known. Milsom suggests !hat !he development came quite late. It may be related
to Magna Carta c.7 (1217). That women could do homage in Bracton's day (BRACTON, supra
note 12, fol. 78b) but not in Glanvill's ( GLANPILL, supra note II, 9.1.2) is symptomatic of the
change if not its cause.
80. I think !his was !he rule even in Glanvill's time at least so far as specified dower was
concerned. See GLANPILL, supra note 11, 6.11-6.13; S. MILSOM, supra note 72, at 43 & n.l;
compare id. at 72-73, 126-27.
81. See BRACTON, supra note 12, fols. 94, at 270-71, 300b, at 368; compare GLANPILL,
supra note 11, 6.17. The cases are sparse.
82. This was already possible in Glanvill's time. GLANPILL, supra note 11, 6.2; see
BRACTON, supra- note 12, fols. 93, at 268, 94-94b, at 271-72.

November 1979]

Marital Property

77

during coverture. It was not until the fourteenth century that it became clear that this entitlement was a minimum. Her husband could
expressly endow her of more, not of less. 83
Each one of these steps expanded the warranty obligation of the
heir - an obligation, as we suggested above, that was derived not
from his ancestor's talcing of homage but from his marriage and one
that ultimately came to depend not on any express or implied conveyance by his ancestor but on a rule oflaw. 84 To have held further
that the heir was bound to give the widow one-half of the acquests
outright would have put a much greater burden on him than the law
was willing to impose even at the end of the century. To have given
the widow one-half of the acquests without the heir's warranty
would have left her defenseless both against him and against the lord
of the land.
In summary, then, the logic of the English warranty system produced a scheme in which all land was alienable and none of it devisable. There was no room in this system for the distinction between
family land and acquests. Soon after Glanvill the distinction disappeared as a basis for the heir to object to his ancestor's alienations. 85
It survived somewhat longer as a basis for determining dower, but
was gone for this purpose probably by mid-century. 86 Dower itself
survived, somewhat surprisingly, but only because it became incorporated in the warranty system.
Thus, England, unlike France, did not have a distinction between
family property and acquests on which to build a community property system. France, on the other hand, did not have a comprehensive system of royal courts to enforce lords' obligations of warranty.
Thus, the logic of warranty, which obliterated the distinction be83. See 2 P & M, supra note 23, at 421-22.
84. The relationship between warranty implied from homage and warranty implied from
conveyance is a difficult one. We have been suggesting that the former is the older of the two
concepts. Warranties are not lacking in twelfth century charters, but they tend to be found in
grants to the Church. See Douglas, Tenure in elemosina: Origins and Establishment in Twe!flh
Century England, AM. J. LEGAL HisT. (forthcoming.) While we cannot preclude the possibility that our perception of this tendency is the result of the greater survival rate of ecclesiastical
charters, it may be that the ecclesiastical grantees were trying to achieve by agreement what
secular tenants got by custom. Ultimately, any grant, whether homage was taken or not, will
carry with it certain warranty obligations, even if the warranty was not expressed. Bailey,
Warranties of Land in the Thirteenth Century (pts. l & 2), 8 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 274, 280-82
(1944), 9 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 82, 100-03 (1945); compare GLANVILL, supra note 11, 7.2. That this
development had not yet been realized in Glanvill's time is suggested by the fact that the
obligations of maritagium (where homage was not taken) were enforced in the ecclesiastical
courts. GLANVILL, supra note 11, 7.18; see Milsom, Inheritance by Women, supra note 31.
85. See T. PLUCKNETT, supra note 72, at 526-30.
86. Id. at 566-67. See also notes 82-83 supra and accompanying text.
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tween family property and acquests in England, was never a controlling force in France. ·
IV.

THE REASON WHY

We have seen how the French came to community property by
means of a distinction between family land and acquests and how
this route was apparently barred to the English. The story leaves
almost as many questions unanswered as it answers. In the case of
France we still have no satisfactory explanation of why half the husband's acquests came to be regarded as belonging to the wife and
vice versa. In the case of England we are required to accept a model
of legal development in which the courts cannot distinguish between
rules designed to keep lords honest and rules which allow a man to
disinherit his wife and children so long as he does it while he is still
breathing. Further, we have to believe that the mechanism of the
distinction between family property and acquests was so important
to the development of community property, at least in thirteenthcentury feudal society, that England could not get there by any other
route. 87
For some, the history traced above will be sufficient explanation
of why England and France differed, granted the state of what is
known and perhaps of what is knowable about how the doctrines in
the two countries developed. There is no question that legal ideas do
have a powerful force, that both the English and the French legal
systems were profoundly conservative, and that there is much which
we still do not know about how the ideas were used so as to produce
the results which we have sketched above. Perhaps what we cannot
explain by the legal ideas that we know is based on our ignorance,
and seeking for explanations outside of the closed system of the law
is a waste of time.
In my view of legal development, however, forces outside of the
closed legal system play a greater role. While I would not deny that
further research is desirable into the mechanisms by which community property developed in France and by which it was rejected in
England, I think it unlikely that such research will produce an explanation which will avoid the leaps in logic we had to make above.
87. Interestingly, Artois, which, as we noted in note 64 supra, had a system of community
of moveables and debts at the beginning of the 14th century, but did not use the distinction
between propres and acquets for marital property purposes, ultimately came to adopt community in acquests as well in the 16th century. Compare Anciennes coutumes d'Arlols tit. 7 (1509),
with Nouvelles coutumes d'Arlois tit. 7 (1544), in I C. BOURDOT DE RICHEBOURO, NOUVEAU
COUTUMIER GENERAL 250-51, 272-73 (Paris, 1724).

November 1979]

Marital Property

79

Thus, I think that we will find nothing inevitable within the logic of
the closed legal system that forces community property in France to
follow from the distinction between family land and acquests, and
separate property in England to follow from warranty run amok. 88
If we look outside the closed legal system, we can roughly categorize the proposed explanations for the rise of community property
into ethnic, economic, political, and social. We probably can reject
out of hand any ethnic explanation based on the marital property
practices of the Germanic peoples, for reasons which we discussed
above. 89 We probably can also reject any economic explanation, although perhaps quite not so facilely as the ethnic. Unquestionably,
by the end of the thirteenth century forms of community property
seem to flourish in urban areas. Further, respectable authority sees a
relationship between impartible inheritance and open-field agriculture,90 and impartible inheritance is basically incompatible with the
scheme of community property that was developed in France.
Nonetheless, I think we can reject any economic explanation of the
difference between England and the north of France in the thirteenth
century based on such economic factors. Community property did
exist in urban areas in France, but it also existed in nonurban areas.
Partible inheritance existed only outside of open-field country in England, but community property existed in open-field country in
France.91
Failing a satisfactory ethnic or economic explanation, we are
driven to the social and political. To do this we must look a little
more closely at the differences between the two systems and at whose
interests were favored by each system:
-In the French system the woman had more control. This is
not to say that she had much in either system, but in some parts of
France the husband could not sell acquired land without her consent, while in England he could sell it subject to her inchoate
dower. 92 Further, some of the French customs seem to have recognized the woman's power to dispose of her share of acquired land by
88. The heir's obligation to warrant could have been expanded to cover acquests as it was
to cover dower; the cui in vita could have been made available to the widow seeking to reclaim
half the acquests which her husband had alienated; the sur cui in vita could have been made
available to her heir. None of these things seems to have happened, but there is nothing in the
logic to prevent it from happening.
89. See notes 52-58 supra and accompanying text.
90. G. HOMANS, ENGLISH VILLAGERS OF THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY chs. 8-9 (1941).
91. See M. BLOCH, supra note 27, at 35-63.
92. Compare J & P, supra note 16, 8.3.2, 9.1.4, and GRAFE, supra note 36, at 138-47 with
sources cited in notes 80-81 supra.
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testament (something which neither party could do in England) and
her power to dispose by testament of her share of the moveables
(something she could do in England, at least so far as the king's
courts were concerned, only with her husband's consent). 93
- Perhaps even more striking than the amount of control the
woman had in marital property is the amount of control the families
of both husband and wife had in it. Family land could not be sold
except for cause, and the family had what amounted to a right of first
refusal in any sale of family land that came from its side (retrait
lignagier). 94 No more than one-fifth of the family land (one-third in
the west) could be devised by either husband or wife or the two together (reserve coutumiere). In some areas this restriction also applied to gifts; in others a system of legitime came to ensure that an
heir would receive no less than one-half of what he would have received in intestacy; in still others no child could be favored to the
detriment of his sibs.95 All these legal institutions placed considerable limitation on both the husband's and the wife's power to give and
to devise.
-The French system ensured that much more property passed
to the wife's family if the marriage were childless than did the English system. Her relatives got her family lands back immediately
rather than having to wait for the husband to die (as they did in
England if a child had been born to the marriage and predeceased its
father) and they took one-half of the acquired lands (and in many
areas one-half of the moveables as well), rather than losing the
whole to the husband. 96
It is hard to escape the general conclusion that what looks at first
blush like a system more favorable to the woman was in fact a system more favorable to the woman's family. She was given a power
to veto the sale of family land and in some areas the sale of acquests
as well, but she had no power to alienate without her husband's consent during coverture, and alienation of her family land was subject
to the restrictions mentioned above. The proceeds of the sale of acquests fell into the community to be subject ultimately to the rights
93. Compare H. AUFFR0Y, supra note SO, at 613-15, with Sheehan, l'!fluence of Canon Law
on the Proper/)' Rights of Married Women in England, 25 MEDIAEVAL STUDIES 109 (1963).
94. See L. FALLETII, LE RETRAIT LI0NAGIER 62-180 (1923); 2 P. OURLIAC & J. DE
MALAF0SSE, HIST0IRE DU DROIT PRtVE 421-39 (2d ed. 1971).
95. See 3 OURLIAC & MALAFOSSE, supra note 22, at 479-98; J. DE LAPLANCHI!, LA
RESERVE C0UTUMIERE DANS L' ANCIEN DR0IT FRAN~AIS 115-339 (1925); J. YVER, E0AL!Tt!
ENTRE HERITIERS ET EXCLUSION DES ENFANTS DOTES: EsSAI DE 0E00RAPHII! C0UTUM!t!RI!

(1966).
96. See text at notes 40-43, 50-51 supra.

November 1979)

Marital Property

81

of the respective families, and family land or acquests could still be
subject to the heirs' right of /egitime. On the other hand, the most
striking feature of the English system is not its demeaning treatment
of married women but rather the extraordinary freedom of alienation that it gave to the man who had seisin ofland in his own right, a
freedom that could, of course, work to his wife's detriment (subject,
however, to her dower rights), but even more to the detriment of his
heirs, and, to the extent that the two differed, of hers.
One final major difference: As has often been pointed out,97 the
English system was remarkably simple for its time. Not only was it
essentially the same system for all the freehold land in the country, a
marked contrast to the multiplicity of French customs, but it also
exhibited a great drive toward unifying control in one person and
passing what he had intact to a single member of the next generation.
Thus, the English system looks like one consciously devised to
simplify the law by concentrating the power of alienation in the
hands of the living holder of the seisin and then passing his estate to
a single male heir. The French system, on the other hand, shows far
less evidence of conscious design. Rather, it appears to be the result
of a number of compromises, varying in detail almost randomly
from place to place, between two lineages, represented for the nonce
by the husband and wife. In short, the English system seems to have
favored the individual and suppressed the wife's interest in the process, while the French favored the lineage and enhanced the wife's
interest as a result.
Before we reach the conclusion, however, that the English were
more individualistic than the French, we must look to see how this
individualism came about. From the point of view of the lord, the
system of warranty that we outlined above had a number of advantages. True, some discretion was lost, but so little by the thirteenth
century that it could hardly have seemed important. In place of this
discretion the lord achieved greater certainty. A rule that says "Take
the homage of the eldest son for all lands of which the tenant died
seised in demesne or in service" considerably eases the tricky problem of homage-taking.98 A rule that clearly compels the tenant's heir
·to do likewise for all lands of which his ancestor died seised in ser91. E.g., 2 P & M, Sllpra note 23, at 273-74.
98. If he takes the wrong man's homage, he will have to provide escambium when the
king's court makes him give the land to the right man. See generally S. MILSOM, S11pra note 72.
When a tenant left only daughters, the early 13th-century lord probably took the homage only
of the eldest (or of her husband) with the younger holding of her. This was to change, but not
until the latter half of the century. See Milsom, Inheritance by Women, S11pra note 31.
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vice reduces the chances of quarrels between the lord's tenants and
their tenants. And the whole system was tilted against partition,
something which was not in the lord's interest, particularly so long as
services remained an important part of the lord/tenant relationship.99 The lord took only one homage and looked to the person
whose homage he had taken for the services; testamentary disposition was prohibited, and conveyances inter vivos by substitution were
still rare and may have required the lord's consent. 100
But the lord was also himself a member of a family, and what
was in his interest as lord may not have been in his interest as family
member. He may have wanted to see that his heir not dissipate the
family fortune while the rest of the family stood by helpless, and he
certainly would have liked to see a part of what his daughters and
sons-in-law acquired during their marriage come to his family if the
marriage proved childless - to take two of the notable di.fferences
between the two countries. His problem, then, was that if he insisted
too much on what was in his interest as lord, he might have found
the same rules being used to his disadvantage as a member of a family when he was dealing with his lord.
Now the only lord who did not have to worry about his lord imposing anti-family rules on him was the lord who had no lord -the
king. Thus we would expect to find the king, if he had the power,
imposing rules which advantaged him as lord, and incidentally all
lords as lords, without too much concern about their possible detrimental effects on his position as the member of a family and on other
lords' positions as members of a family. 101
The key words in the last sentence, of course, are "if he had the
power." The peculiarly powerful position of the twelfth- and thir99. So long as services were important (whether they were personal or commuted for
money), the lord wanted to have one person to whom he could look for the performance of
those services and to ensure that the land was kept as an integral economic unit so that it could
produce the surplus to support the services. As the incidents, such as wardship and marriage,
became more important to the lord than the services (something which happened over the
course of the 13th century because of the declining real value of fixed money payments), the
desirability of a single homage declined, though the need for an integral economic unit remained. By this time some rules had become too well established to be changed, even though
they were designed more to meet the needs of the old system: primogeniture, the prohibition
on testamentary disposition of land, and- dare we add? - the absence of any right in the
widow to more than dower in acquests. Some things did change to accommodate the new
realities. Lords came to take the homage of all female heirs, see note 98 supra, and conveyance by subinfeudation was abolished by the statute Quia emptores. 18 Edw. I, c.l (1290).
Thus, the fact that the French legal development came in the second half of the 13th century
rather than the first, see text following note 20 supra, takes on added significance.
100. See T. PLUCKNETI, CONCISE HISTORY, supra note 72, at 538-41; compare T.
PLUCKNETI, LEGISLATION, supra note 32, at 94-108.
101. See generally Holt, supra note 71.
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teenth-century English kings with their centralized system of courts
has long been a commonplace of medieval history, as has the relatively weak position of the French kings. That the French kings
would have liked to proceed in the direction of England is indicated
by Philip Augustus's ordonnance of 1219 which attempted to abolish
the right of the heirs of a childless woman who precedeased her husband to take a share of the moveables and acquests. 102 While the
intended geographical scope of the ordonnance is open to question, 103 it seems to indicate a general policy against division of acquests between the woman's heirs and the husband. If this was the
royal policy, it failed. Philip Augustus had not been preceded by a
Henry II; there was no system of royal courts to enforce his ordonnance.

Plausible as this explanation of the English developments may
seem, it strikes me that it is not completely satisfactory. The crucial
legal events that established the English system occurred in the first
part of the thirteenth century, and the years that saw Magna Carta,
the minority of Henry III, and the Provisions of Oxford can hardly
be regarded as a high-water mark in the power of the English monarchy. Further, it is hard to imagine that the king and his advisers
could not have foreseen that property rules devised for the king's
vassals might not redound to the disadvantage of the king's family. 104 Finally, it is difficult to see much anti-family bias in a legal
system that in 1285 authorized the entail of land, 105 a device which
became far more rigid than the French reserve coutumiere or retrait
lignagier.
If a political explanation fails to explain fully, perhaps we can

adduce a social explanation to aid it. Not only was the French king
relatively weak in comparison to the English by the beginning of the
thirteenth century, but the French family was relatively strong. The
power and stability of the French upper class family seems quite well
established as early as the twelfth century. Georges Duby, for example, has shown that thirty-four families held most of the land in
twelfth-century Ma.con, that these families were essentially the same
as those who held it in the mid-tenth century, and that by the year
102. 1 ORD0NNANCES DES ROYS DE FRANCE DE LA TROISIEME RACE 38 (M. de Lauriere
ed. 1723); compare Philip's now-lost ordonnance on dower, supra note 63.
103. See Lemaire, supra note 22, at 631-32 & n.l.
104. The casus regis, the problem whether the son of the deceased older brother or the
living younger brother should inherit when the propositus died childless, was not resolved for
fifty years; it was the situation of John and Arthur of Brittany. See 1 P & M, supra note 23, at
513-14; 2 P & M, supra note 23, at 283-86; S. MILS0M, supra note 72, at 175-76.
105. See note 32 supra and accompanying text.
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1100 these families were managing to keep their patrimony intact. 106
Now I do not mean to suggest that England had no great families or
that family property was unimportant. I do mean to suggest, with
Sidney Painter, that great families played less of a role in England
than they did in France, at least at the beginning of the thirteenth
century. 107 English family memory is short; the Conquest saw to
that. And the power of central government is substantial. The situation may well have changed by the end of the century; the rise of the
entail would indicate that it had. But by this time the French solution was no longer available: the distinction between family land
and acquests had been buried.
Further, the ability of the French family to influence the rules of
succession was enhanced by a characteristic of French landholding.
English land, as a result of the Conquest, was all held of someone
and ultimately of the king; 108 French land was not. Some of it, although a decreasing amount, was allodial land, with respect to which
family forces had relatively free play. 109 The existence of a system of
inheritance for allodial land in which family forces could proceed
relatively unchecked may have hindered the development of a system more favorable to the lord for feudal land.
We now have two explanations: one political-the power of the
English king was greater than that of the French- and one socialat a critical point the French family was a more important institution than the English. These two elements go much of the way toward explaining why the French family acquired greater control
over family land, why the distinction between family land and acquests disappeared from English law. But they do not tell us why
England did not come to community property by some other
route. 110 They do not explain why in France the woman seems to
have had some testamentary power over half of the acquests and
some power to give them away to the detriment of her heirs if she
survived her husban4, why acquests came to be called community
property rather than simply subject to peculiar succession provisions,
why moveables were brought within the community - in short, why
106. Duby, Lignage, noblesse et chevalerie au xi;e siecle dans la region maconnaise, 21 AN·
NALES 803 (1972); see generally DUBY, LA S0CIETE AU XIE ET XIIE SIECLES DANS LA REGION
MAC0NNAISE (1953); J. HEER, LE CLAN FAMILIAL AU M0YEN AGE (1974).

107. See Painter, The Family and the Feudal System in Twelfth Century England, 35 SPECU·
1 (1960).
108. 1 P & M, supra note 23, at 232-40.
109. See, e.g., DUBY, LA S0CIETE, supra note 106, at 291-92; cf. 2 OURLIAC & MALAFOSSE,
supra note 94, at 134-35, 139-40, 211 (sources cited), 338.
110. See note 88 supra.
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French law in the late thirteenth century was pointing toward all
those things which were to become the classic communaute des
meub/es et acqu~ts, the Napoleonic Code's jointly owned fund subject to the husband's management. To explain this we need another
socio-legal institution- the familial community. m
If the impression that the lineage was a less important institution
in England than in France must remain just that - an impression we can be on more solid ground when we come to speak of familial
communities, the social and legal practice of holding family property
in a large undivided mass. 112 This practice existed in France, particularly among small rural freeholders; it did not, so far as we can tell,
exist in England.
We may speculate that the familial community reaches back to
the remotest antiquity among the Germanic peoples or perhaps even
among the pre-Germanic inhabitants of Western Europe, but the evidence is most thin. 113 What we do know is that it did exist in
France in the thirteenth century- Beaumanoir devotes a justly famous chapter to it 114 - and that it continued to exist in some parts
of France at least into the sixteenth century. us Try as we may, however, we can find no firm evidence of it in England. 116 The AngloSaxon laws contain no reference to it; Anglo-Saxon charters are remarkable for their relative absence of family consents; Domesday
Book gives us practically no hint of it, and there is nothing in
111. An excellent introduction to this topic is J. GAUDEMET, LES C0MMUNAUTES FAMILIALES (1962); see also Hilaire, Vie en commun,famille et esprit communautaire, 51 REVUE HIST0RIQUE DE DROIT FRANC,:AIS ET ETRANGER 8 (1973).
112. In addition to the sources cited in note 111 supra, see 2 OURLIAC & MALAF0SSE,
supra note 94, at 142-43, 438; 3 id. 63-65, 83 (sources cited), 395, 489-91.
113. See sources cited in 2 OURLIAC & MALAF0SSE, supra note 94, at 438.
114. BEAUMANOIR, supra note 14, § 625.
115. J. GAUDEMET, supra note Ill, at 126-31.
I 16. 2 P & M, supra note 23, at 245-55, is classic. Maitland's proposition is denied in J.
BRAUDE, DIE FAMILIENGEMEINSCHAFTEN DER ANGELSACHSEN (Slichishe Forschungsinstitut
in Leipzig, Forschungsinstitut filr Rechtsgeschichte, Rechtsgeschichtlich Abhandlungen No. 3,
1932), see id. at 39-96, and again more recently by Howell, supra note 23, at I 13-22. For the
most recent contribution to the debate, see A. MACFARLANE, THE ORIGINS OF ENGLISH INDIVIDUALISM (1979). For our purposes a relatively weak proposition will suffice. We need not
engage in the debate whether the kin-group was an important institution in Anglo-Saxon England. The Anglo-Saxon codes, particularly the early ones, depend on its existence, though we
may doubt whether it was quite so strong or extensive as it was on the Continent. See B.
PHILLPOTTS, KINDRED AND CLAN IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND AFTER (1913). What we must
affirm with Maitland is that evidence for a legal notion in England of family ownership of
property, as manifested in the codes, charters, and surveys, is very skimpy in comparison with
evidence from at least some parts of France. Braude's evidence suggests, at best, that at some
times in some places the idea and the practice may have existed, but only his assumption that
fa/eland was different in this regard from hoc/and allows him to assert that the idea was ever
dominant.
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Glanvill or Bracton remotely approaching Beaumanoir's communaute taisible.
Now the familial community was not the same thing as the marital community. The familial community was a group of nuclear
families sharing one bread and one pot and pooling their resources
in common. The marital community, at least in its medieval French
form, involved only the nuclear family. Nonetheless in a society that
had long practiced familial community, the gradual dissolution of
familial communities as a consequence of greater wealth and greater
urbanization could have left in its wake marital communities, a joint
ownership of at least some of the property of the largest unit which
now shared one bread and one pot. 117
Although England had all the other elements which led to community property in France, it lacked this one essential element.
Without any strong tradition of community, the English lawyers
could not group these same elements together and call it community.
They lacked at the early stage the social practice around which the
117. It is quite a leap to go from an institution largely evidenced among small rural freeholders to the charters of the wealthy, but recent research in the charters from just before and
during the period with which we are dealing appears to support the suggestion made in the
text. The method of the research is to tabulate the consents of members of the family of the
grantor in a large number of charters and to compare the resulting statistics across time and/or
across geographic regions. The method is fraught with difficulties, chiefly because we normally do not know why any given charter includes the consents. See Stephen D. White,
" 'Laudatio Parentum' in Northern France in the Eleventh and Twelfth Centuries: Some Unanswered Questions" (unpublished paper delivered at the 92d Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, Dec. 28-30, 1977). Nonetheless, a number of studies have noted
that over the years 1100-1300 in northern France charters reflect fewer consents by family
members other than the spouse (usually the wife), the proportion of whose consents remains
relatively constant or increases. See, e.g., Hajdu, Family and Feudal Ties in Poitou, 1100-1JOO,
8 J. INTERDISCIPLINARY H!ST. 117, 120-24 (1977); 1 R. FOSSIER, LA TERRE ET LES HOMMES EN
PICARDIE 262-73 (1968); cf. Penny S. Gold, Image and Reality: Women in Twelfth Century
France 206-98 (1977) (unpublished Stanford University Ph.D. thesis). Making all the necessary qualifications, there is some support here for the notion that the legal notion of conjugal
community may have emerged out of broader and probably vaguer ideas of familial community. No statistical study has yet been done of the surviving English charters of the same
period. My own highly impressionistic soundings suggest: (1) that in England as in France the
proportion of charters containing family consents declines markedly over the course of the
13th century; (2) that the proportion of charters containing family consents is at every period
markedly lower in England than it is in France; and (3) that unlike in France consent by wives
in England suffers a decline over the course of the 13th century similar to that suffered by
consents of other family members. The statistics are too rough to warrant publication, but
they are based on samples of25-50 r.harters, controlled for date, with comparisons drawn from
the following cartularies: DANELAW DOCUMENTS, supra note 19, and CARTULAIRE DE TIRON,
supra note 19 Qatter half of the 12th century); LIBER CONTROVERSIARUM SANCTI VINCENTII
CENOMANNESIS (A. Chedeville ed. 1968) and RUFFORD CHARTERS (C. Holdsworth ed.,
Thoroton Socy. Record Series Nos. 29 (1972) & 30 (1974)) Qate 12th and early 13th centuries);
6 RECUEIL DES CHARTES DE L'ABBAYE DE CLUNY (A. Bernard & A. Brue! eds. 1903) and 2
HISTORIA ET CARTULARIUM SANCTI PETRI GLOUCESTRIAE (YI. Hart ed. Rolls Series No. 33,
1865) (1250 to C. 1275); 2 CHARTES DE SAINT-MAOLOIRE, supra note 49, and CARTULARY OF
HOLY TRINITY ALDOATE (G. Hodgett ed., London Record Socy. Pubs, No. 7) (urban, late 13th
century).
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legal concept could crystallize and at a slightly later stage the legal
concept around which the social practice could crystallize.
It is tempting to go one step further - to ask whether this concept of community was anything more for the thirteenth-century
French authors than a convenient device for describing succession
patterns. While we must avoid, as a previous generation of French
legal historians sometimes did not, reading too much policy into the
early coutumiers, we can, I think, see glimmerings of a very modem
split in policy. Dower, the Livres de jostice et pfet tell us, is given to
protect the widow, because she needs it for support, because she has
had to be subservient to her husband, because she has borne the pain
of childbirth. 118 On the other hand, the marital community,
Beaumanoir tells us, is like the community Qf merchants, the contractual community, or the community of relatives sharing one bread
and pot. 119 The implication, never quite stated, is that the woman is
entitled to half the acquests and moveables because she has worked
in partnership with her husband to get them. Can we go further and
suggest that England, by adopting dower and not the community of
moveables and acquests, was concerned solely with the protection of
widows and did not perceive that the woman had any entitlement to
property par raison de fa compagnie? 120
V.

CONCLUSION

As lawyers we deal constantly with legal change on a rational
level: we marshall principles and policies for and against change.
As historians or comparatists we can afford the luxury of probing
deeper, to the unconscious, to the irrational, even to the random. So
far as we know, no one in the thirteenth century debated whether to
adopt community or separate property in the way the merits of various inheritance customs were debated in the sixteenth century. 121
Thus, all of our proposed explanations for why the English and
French marital property systems diverged in the thirteenth century
seek causes which, again so far as we know, were not brought up to
the conscious level by those who were making the rules.
I have suggested four explanations for the divergence: the peculiarly English doctrine of warranty (what we might call the "technical legal explanation"); the power of the English king (what we
See J & P, supra note 16, 10.21.l.
supra note 14, § 622, compare id. §§ 621, 623-625.
J & P, supra note 16, 12.24.5.
See Thirsk, The European .Debate on Customs of Inheritance, 1500-1700, in FAMILY
AND INHERITANCE, supra note 23, at 177-91.
118.
119.
120.
121.

BEAUMANOIR,
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called "the political explanation"); the strength of the French family
(what we called "the social explanation"); and the French institution
of familial communities (what we might call "the anthropological
explanation"). Each of these explanations implies a model of legal
development, and, curiously, rationality plays a larger role in the political and social models than it does in the anthropological and technical-legal models.
The political explanation implies the existence of a rational lawmaker. There must be a rule; he chooses the rule which enhances his
(or his boss's) interest as lord. Royal rules obstruct community property in England but not in France,. because the French king has
neither the power nor the institutions to make or enforce the rules.
The social argument implies a conflict of interests: families against
lords. Neither interest can completely dominate the other, if only
because they are frequently embodied in the same people; so the resulting rules reveal a series of compromises. In these compromises,
however, the stronger social force, lordship in England, the family in
France, gets somewhat the better of the deal.
Both the technical legal explanation and the anthropological one
begin with a social institution: warranty in one case, familial communities in the other. The institution finds an expression in a legal
idea which makes explicit the social norm. In each case, however,
the idea comes to do more and more work. Warranty becomes the
way to enforce other social institutions, like dower. Community ultimately takes over for the idea of partnership (compagnie), at least in
the marital context.
One example is hardly enough to build a model on, particularly
where, as in this case, there are a number of possible explanations
which are not mutually incompatible. To the extent that it is possible to generalize from this one example, however, it would seem that
it illustrates the uncontrolled and to some extent irrational force of
legal ideas operating away from the influence of conscious policy
choice. In this case, at least, the political and social explanations fail
to explain fully, while a more structural approach, at least in my
view, seems better to account for the evidence.

